Within the financialisation literature, a number of approaches identify the coexistence of financial expansion and productive stagnation. Yet there is no consensus on which direction causality operates between these two phenomena. This impasse has been widened by the lack of attention paid to the role of statecraft strategies in mediating possible causal mechanisms.
Introduction
f a single root cause has predominated in explanations of the current global financial crisis, it is "deregulation"' (67). Yet financial deregulation is often now taken as the point of departure, from which to explain the consequent changes in state/market dynamics; rather than close attention being paid to the perceived governing advantages that motivated deregulation in the first place. This latter puzzle is the key focus of this article, and is of great political significance. Hillary Clinton's struggle in reconciling the paid speeches she gave to Wall Street with her candidacy in the 2016 Democratic primaries is a good example of how one explanation of financial deregulation -state capture by financial eliteshas become a serious concern for the US electorate (NYT 2016) . Indeed, diagnoses of the causes of financial deregulation have great bearing on the question of 'what is to be done?'; that is, stronger state insulation from financial lobbying, closing the revolving door between the financial sector and government, or a more radical reimagining of social relations.
This article begins by arguing that within the financialisation literature there exists a strand that focuses on the relationship between real economy stagnation and financial expansion. There is no consensus on the direction of causality between these twin phenomena, with expropriation accounts arguing that the bloated financial sector has sapped resources from industry, while crisis resolution accounts insist weaknesses in the productive economy have necessitated financial expansion as a palliative. A major shortcoming in this literature is the lack of attention paid to state governance strategies, despite financial deregulation playing a central role in the narratives of both approaches. This mirrors a broader problem with how IPE -of both the dichotomous 'states and markets' and neo-Gramscian-inspired variants -has traditionally understood state/market relations. It will be argued that this financialisation debate would greatly benefit from an engagement with the literature on depoliticisation and crisis -a trail blazed by Krippner (2011) . By taking statecraft seriously we can gain further insight into how states have used financial deregulation to insulate themselves from political criticism. This will shed light on the validity of the expropriation and crisis resolution explanations, as well as providing a clearer understanding of the strategic nature of state/market relations.
In order to examine the relationship between financial deregulation and statecraft, this article will analyse Britain's 1971 Competition and Credit Control (CCC) measures. CCC revolutionised monetary policy by shifting emphasis away from quantitative restrictions on bank lending and towards interest rates. In the process, the government dismantled the majority of its direct controls on banks, leading CCC to be characterised as perhaps the first major financial deregulation of the postwar era (Buckle and Thompson 1992: 43) . By all accounts, this was a disaster: bank lending to the private sector rose from £1.9 to £6.4 billion in a single year, an enormous property bubble emerged, and the Secondary Banking Crisis struck in 1973 (Wilson Committee 1980: 7) . Yet rather than rehearse the story of CCC's failure, this article will draw on evidence from the National Archives and the University of Warwick's Modern Records Centre to analyse the reasoning behind the Treasury's passing of this deregulation. It will be argued that it was the intensifying economic stagnation, expressed as a personal borrowing boom and a crisis of company liquidity, that demonstrated to the Treasury that the existing monetary controls were unsuited for maintaining a balance of payments surplus. The lending ceilings could neither effectively redistribute credit from individuals to companies nor hide the state's hand in the process. The Bank of England's (referred to here as the Bank) CCC proposal, by allocating credit according to ability to pay higher interest rates, promised to both channel financial resources away from consumers and towards exporting firms, and to mask the state's role in the process. It was this combination of functional and depoliticising advantages that led the Treasury to accept CCC.
Two important conclusions for IPE can be drawn from this case. Firstly, the evidence presented here, while insufficient to dismiss the broader claims of the expropriation approach, does support the crisis resolution claims that deregulation was a response to the dwindling of postwar prosperity. However, secondly, the case of CCC demonstrates the importance of taking statecraft seriously as an explanatory factor. The state did not automatically deregulate finance at the first sign of crisis.
Instead, deregulation resulted from the state's search for a form of governance that could depoliticise the state's role in managing crisis, by outsourcing the enforcement of financial discipline to the price mechanism. This suggests -in the same manner as Krippner (2007) -that IPE should focus on how states relate strategically to markets, rather than remaining preoccupied with the illusory notion of the state/market tug of war.
Financialisation and the role of statecraft
Since the 1990s, the term financialisation has been used to describe a great variety of phenomena, as well as projected into the past to characterise older theories. The purpose here is not to provide a more or less comprehensive overview of this large body of literature, but instead to examine a specific strand of this literature that is concerned with the causal relationship between economic stagnation and financial profligacy. A number of approaches within the broad rubric of financialisation have recognised the coexistence of two important trends in advanced capitalist economies since the 1970s: the slowdown of growth in the real economy, evidenced by low rates of fixed capital investment and relatively weak GDP growth; and the expansion of the financial sector, reflected in the proliferation of financial instruments and the inflation and bursting of credit bubbles (van Treeck 2009 ). Yet there is a sharp disagreement on the direction of causality between these two phenomena. These approaches can roughly be grouped into two categories: expropriation, which claims that financial expansion has weakened the real economy; and crisis resolution, which proposes that the weaknesses in the real economy have provoked financial expansion.
Scholars advancing the expropriation thesis have tended to argue that a significant transformation in corporate strategy has taken place since the 1980s, away from longterm fixed capital investments and towards short-term measures to keep stock prices rising. In pursuit of this objective, companies ploughed retained earnings back into their own stock and increased dividend payments to shareholders, draining the reserves available for future investment (Stockhammer 2004; Lazonick 2011 ).
Furthermore, earnings that were reinvested became increasingly directed towards short-term financial assets, such as securitised debt. Income streams based on this interest-accruing activity began to outpace traditional returns from fixed investment (Orhangazi 2008) . As Crotty (2003: 2) argues, the net result of these developments has been the restructuring of the non-financial corporation from 'an integrated combination of illiquid real assets' to a '"portfolio" of liquid subunits that … management must continually restructure to maximise the stock price'.
Financialisation, as such, constitutes the 'parasitic' transfer of rents from productive to financial capital (Duménil & Lévy 2002: 62) .
Crisis resolution approaches posit causality in the opposite direction. There are two different chains of causation proposed in this literature: one in which finance props up effective demand, and the other in which finance supports stagnating production.
The first explanation relies on the existence of a contradiction within capitalist society between economic uncertainty/instability and the need for 'confident mass consumers' (Crouch 2009: 320) . Following the inflationary crisis of the 1970s, a new strategy to alleviate this contradiction emerged, namely 'privatised Keynesianism' (Crouch 2009 ) or what Hay et al. (2008) termed 'house price Keynesianism'. This consisted chiefly of the extension of private credit instruments to working people, especially cheap mortgages, in order to stimulate consumption and assuage the social conflict arising from the wage repression of the neoliberal era (Crouch 2009; Watson 2010; Streeck 2011 ).
The second type of crisis resolution explanation focuses on the weaknesses of productive capital. For Arrighi (2010) , this is a historically recurrent phenomenon that characterises the moment in which hegemonic capitalist economies reach the end of their lifecycle. The Marxian-Kaleckian school claims that, during the era of 'monopoly capitalism', massive barriers to market entry cause stagnation in fixed investment, and surpluses are instead channeled into financial assets (Bellamy Foster 2007) . Alternatively, other Marxist scholars argue that the falling rate of profit on productive investments 1 has triggered an expansion of credit as a palliative measure, as well as the shifting of corporate investment funds from fixed capital to more profitable financial assets Kliman 2012) . Common to these diverse approaches is the notion that the frenzied expansion of finance has served as a 'temporal fix' to the underlying crisis in capitalist production, by postponing the crisis into the future (Harvey 2006).
The greatest shortcoming of the expropriation and crisis resolution approaches is their treatment of the state. The problem is not that the state is absent and needs to be 'brought back in' (Evans et al. 1985; Helleiner 1995) . State action, via financial deregulation, is a crucial mechanism through which causality operates in both accounts. Rather, the problem is that the state is simply understood as a conduit for economic forces and elite interests, instead of an important strategic actor in its own right. More specifically, insufficient attention is paid to 'statecraft' -the governance strategies through which states seek to achieve their policy objectives without sacrificing their legitimacy (Bulpitt 1986: 21 ). Bulpitt's statecraft thesis focuses on the 'Court' -defined as the Prime Minister and their friends and advisors (Buller 1999: 694) . The Court, Bulpitt argued, strategises so as to achieve a degree of 'governing competence' over economic activity while also securing their (re)election (Bulpitt 1986: 22) . Despite the fact that Bulpitt focused on political leaders, the concept of statecraft has consequently been used to analyse the strategic machinations of less senior politicians and even unelected officials operating within the Treasury and Bank (Rogers 2009; Burnham 2011 ). Yet central to all statecraft analyses -and conspicuously missing from the financialisation literature's treatment of the state -is a focus on state actors' attempts to strategically reconcile two objectives: legitimacy and governability.
From an expropriation perspective, Stockhammer (2004; Crisis resolution approaches, on the other hand, explain the government's motivation in promoting finance as arising from two sources. Firstly, leading capitalist states reacted quite automatically to the crises of industrial stagnation and global hegemony by freeing up excess funds through credit market deregulation (Brenner 2002: 40-42; Arrighi 2010: 326) . Secondly, by 'pulling forward future resources into [the] present', financial deregulation constituted a 'strategy of socialconflict management', whereby various sectors of society could be appeased with lax credit rules (Streeck 2011: 12-17) . While this moves beyond the expropriation view of the state as a reflection of factional struggles, the state is still conceived as a primarily reactive entity. States are understood to face external imperatives from markets, to which they must react accordingly; such that there is little consideration of how changing statecraft strategies blur the line between political and marketised governance. Krippner (2011) , with her focus on the US authorities' experimentation with financial deregulation as a way to insulate policy-making from scrutiny, is the only exception to this trend.
This inattention to statecraft reflects a more general shortcoming with how certain influential IPE approaches have theorised state/market relations. Despite the radical orientation of the authors, many crisis resolution approaches, with their emphasis on the external market imperatives faced by states, reproduce a politics/economy dichotomy similar to that found in the more mainstream IPE works of Gilpin (1987) and Strange (1997) The problem with both of these lines of argument, as they exist in financialisation debates and IPE discussions of state/market relations, is that they take the state seriously only insofar as it is a vessel buffeted by market forces or colonised by economic interests. The task of studying statecraft itself is thus rendered nonessential.
Depoliticised statecraft
This impasse can be overcome by focusing on how financialisation has been mediated by the statecraft of depoliticisation. This idea has recently gained traction amongst IPE scholars. Lagna (2016) examines how the Italian state has used derivatives to extend its control over the economy through a financialised, and thus seemingly non-political, avenue. Similarly, Major (2012: 537) argues that governments have attempted to mask their responsibility for economic management through the 'movement of regulatory activities into technocratic, insular institutions'.
Yet neither work references the extensive literature on depoliticisation, of which there is arguably already a 'second wave' (Hay 2014) .
Depoliticisation is a concept that has been operationalised to explain a host of different phenomena across a variety of social science disciplines. However, common to all is a focus on the process of removing the 'politics' from a specific sphere of social life. Wood and Flinders (2014) provide a useful summary of the varying interpretations, which they categorise into three broad groups: governmental, societal and discursive. This article, which focuses on the depoliticisation strategies consciously employed by state actors, will draw on literature that generally falls into the first category (governmental). As a statecraft strategy, depoliticisation refers to a form of governance in which state actors seek to reconcile legitimacy and governability objectives by seemingly emptying economic policy of its political content, so that it appears to be a purely technical affair. Bulpitt (1986: 28-32) writes that the discipline of governance requires state authorities to gain a certain autonomy from the pressures of various sections of society by seeking to establish 'automatic rules or pilots' that allow for the 'euthanasia of politics'. The goal of depoliticisation is to place 'at one remove the political character of decision-making' so as to allow the state to achieve its policy goals in a more insulated and effective manner (Burnham 2001: 128) . When this strategy is successful, the authorities can hope to attain credibility in the eyes of global financial markets, reduce the burden of policymaking through delegation, and avoid blame for policy failures (Flinders and Buller 2006: 296) .
Depoliticisation is particularly useful for explaining statecraft in the context of economic crisis (Donmez 2014) . Kettell (2008: 631) points out that governments of democratic capitalist polities must reproduce the conditions for profitable capital accumulation, while displaying 'at least a semblant of a connection to the views and wishes of the electorate'. This is referred to by Watson (2009) and Rogers (2013) as the contradiction between 'accumulation' and 'legitimation'. When capital accumulation falters, as in the 'generalized austerity characteristic of the neoliberal era', this dilemma is intensified -the state must both manage a lackluster economy and avoid blame for this poor performance in the eyes of the electorate (Krippner 2007: 479 (Moran 1984) .
In short, the state ceased to impose a preferential system of credit distribution upon the banking sector, instead allowing the market to allocate credit to whoever could pay the highest interest rate.
In explaining this policy transformation, the existing literature focuses on the Bank, which played the predominant role in formulating CCC. It is possible to discern three rapidly, clearing banks began to lose market share to institutions offering higher interest rates (Gowland 1978: 84) . This threatened the Bank's monetary governance, because they used the clearing banks as an intermediary through which to transmit monetary policy to the entire banking system (Needham 2014: 30-1) . By abolishing the cartel, the clearing banks would be forced to increase their competitivity and thus reassert their dominance, safeguarding the Bank's mechanism of monetary control. The aforementioned factors explain the Bank's desire to institute a more laissezfaire system, but the reasons for the Treasury's acceptance of CCC are less clear.
While CCC was implemented in October 1971, the Bank had informed the Treasury of its progress in January and sent earlier drafts to them in February -rather late in the day, but still enough time for the Treasury to make its influence felt. The
Treasury's collective thought process during this period has been explained in a number of ways. Many authors have ignored the Treasury's role or have treated this issue as a black box (Gowland 1978; Capie 2010; Reid 1982 This article will contribute to overcoming the lack of clarity on the Treasury's motivations for approving of CCC, through a close archival analysis. This focus on the Treasury derives from the fact that its role in passing CCC has faced limited academic scrutiny, unlike the role of the Bank. In addition, this analysis will follow recent contributions (Rogers 2009; Burnham 2011) in extending Bulpitt's statecraft thesis to important officials and advisors within the Treasury -who, it will be demonstrated, also faced pressures to reconcile legitimacy and governability. When dealing with the 'esoteric politics' of pre-Thatcherite monetary policy, Moran (1984: 27 ) is right to argue that much of the focus must necessarily be on the relatively small cabal of civil servants that operated monetary levers. Elected ministers, while important to the analysis, played a more broadly guiding role.
The evidence presented in this article will show that the Treasury was neither duped by the Bank nor was industry simply out-lobbied by the City. Instead, the stagnation crisis, expressed as a boom in personal and corporate borrowing, politicised the existing monetary controls and pushed the Treasury to accept CCC as way to redistribute credit from labour to capital in a depoliticised fashion.
The Treasury's dilemma
The crisis that was gathering momentum by the end of the 1960s appeared to the Treasury in the form of two intractable obstacles to smooth economic governance: a stubborn growth in personal borrowing in the face of real wage stagnation; and a corporate liquidity crisis resulting from a secular fall in profitability. More specifically, these two phenomena wrought havoc with the authorities' chief policy aim, post-devaluation, namely to mount a sustained recovery in the balance of payments. This governing failure in turn brought scrutiny upon the Treasury, such that their attempted regressive redistribution of credit from persons to companies became blatantly politicised, endangering the insular nature of British statecraft.
Personal borrowing
A key monetary policy goal, following devaluation, was to reduce lending for personal consumption as a way to reduce imports. The austerity that accompanied devaluation in 1967 hit workers hard, as the wage share of GDP had peaked in the early 1960s and had since begun to decline (Murphy 2011 Thus, in November 1968 the credit ceiling was further reduced to 98 per cent of its 1967 level, with credit for exports and shipbuilding excluded. The intention to redistribute credit away from personal consumption and towards capital was explicit.
As Treasury economist Arnold Lovell told Treasury official Robert Armstrong later that year: 'We do not want to inhibit industrial expansion or activity … we do want to curb the growth in consumer demand, in the hope that this will encourage the shift of resources into exports'.
5
Yet banks quickly developed ways to evade the authorities' controls, as they began to lose customers to new secondary banks. The main finance houses started to ignore the government's requests to provide personal loans with terms at least as strict as the hire purchase rules. By April 1971 Barclays had announced the launch of a new personal loans scheme, which would extend credit 'from £100 to £1,000, to anyone over 18, whether a customer of Barclays or not, who is credit-worthy and in regular employment'. 6 This represented an 'embarrassing' circumvention of government policy. 7 In addition to wielding monetary policy to directly reduce consumption, the Treasury also did so indirectly, by using credit control as an industrial relations strategy. Industrial conflict intensified from the mid-1960s, with the number of days lost to strikes rising from 2.8 million in 1967 to 10.9 million in 1970 when the Conservatives arrived in power (Whittingham and Towers 1977: 77) . This conflict meant that any perceived monetary relaxation could be interpreted by the unions as the beginning of another boom period, fuelling bolder pay demands. 8 If monetary relaxation boosted demand when industrial output was crippled by strikes, the effect on the balance of payments would be negative: 'There was a distinct chance of industrial unrest and if this transpired it would be dangerous to stimulate demand for cars since the effect would be to increase imports'. . 10 Yet this would send the wrong message to car firms with regards to pay settlements: 'The industry has undoubtedly been the maverick of employers in the private sector so far as incomes restraint is concerned. It has totally disregarded the Government's exhortations to exercise moderation'. 11 As such, if any monetary relaxation took place 'the industry will I am sure feel that it has nothing to fear from the Government and that much of the talk about punishment for those who transgress in the field of pay negotiations is without substance '. 12 This highlights the inability of existing monetary controls to achieve the government's stated policy goals. The same action necessary to discourage inflationary pay claims would simultaneously threaten the liquidity and export capacity of British capital -a problem that will become more clear in the following section.
Corporate liquidity
The crisis in corporate liquidity was recognised by the Treasury later than the personal borrowing boom, yet when it was acknowledged it was regarded as a fundamental challenge to their governing objectives. British industrial and commercial companies' rate of profit fell from 14.2 per cent in 1960 to 8.7 per cent in 1970. 13 As a result, their net liquidity tumbled from the early 1960s, hovering around zero from 1965-68, before plummeting to a deficit of more than £1,000 million by 1970 (CBI 1977: 15-17) . In response, companies extended their bank overdrafts.
From 1956-60, 90 per cent of industrial and commercial companies' funds came from internal sources (chiefly retained profits) and just 10 per cent came from external sources (bank borrowing, government grants etc.). Yet by 1966-70, the ratio had changed to 80 per cent and 20 per cent (Thomas 1978: 310 So far it appears that companies have coped with the squeeze on them by running down their liquid resources, taking trade credit wherever possible, repatriating funds from abroad and economising on stocks … The question is whether, nevertheless, companies will be forced by the financial stringency to prune their investment plans unless steps are taken to enable them to acquire extra finance from the banks, from the capital market or from the Government. Private Secretary R T Armstrong explained, 'there is no future in retaining the ceiling but exempting "credit for investment" from it. This is simply unworkable: the banks cannot identify credit to particular firms by purpose to the extent that this would indicate'. 20 Furthermore, even if the credit ceilings could discriminate in this way, the Treasury's Permanent Secretary Douglas Allen argued 'it could not be altered frequently, and it was difficult to enforce effectively'.
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The post-devaluation system of monetary controls was not designed for this stagnant economic epoch. The contradictory need to both combat personal borrowing and alleviate industry's liquidity drought pulled the controls in opposing directions.
The Treasury's key governing goal -to achieve a sustainable balance of payments surplus -was therefore jeopardised. Yet in addition to these functional shortcomings, the system of lending ceilings also challenged the government's preference for depoliticised forms of statecraft. This will be examined next.
The politicisation of monetary control
Lending ceilings, which had also been used in 1957-58 and 1961-2, were initially considered a depoliticised avenue through which to conduct monetary policy. There were two institutional layers separating the government from direct borrowers, namely the Bank of England and the clearing banks. This allowed the government to mask its influence on the money supply. As Painter commented
The whole apparatus of "control" is a voluntary arrangement, operated as the City seem to prefer through the Bank of England in the driving seat. As long as the business carries on without too much controversy, there are advantages to
Westminster and Whitehall in it being conducted at this remove. Managers were tending to lose heart and the public image of the banks was getting worse and worse… The banks wondered whether H.M.Goverment [sic] fully understood their difficulties. They (the banks) feared that they would have to take the blame for the consequences of credit restriction. 28 Furthermore, it was not entirely clear whether the government even had the power to enforce their own directives. A Bank solicitor informed Lovell in 1969 that banks' overdraft facilities could not be limited, and furthermore, attempts to punish the banks by lowering the interest rates on special deposits may not be legally enforceable.
enforcement of lending ceilings, the authorities risked sparking a very public conflict with the City, which they could not be sure they would win.
Another source of scrutiny faced by the authorities was from the global investing that if the authorities were not seen to respond to ballooning bank loans 'the Government's monetary policy and policies for management of the economy generally would lose credibility'. 31 The inadequacy of existing controls meant that any stated monetary target could quickly come back to haunt the authorities. With bank lending well above the five to seven per cent target in July and August 1970, the authorities had to respond in order to demonstrate that they had not lost control, without making unachievable commitments: 'The essential task for us is to devise some weasely words which justify whatever signal we give to the clearing banks without pinning ourselves on the 5%/7% hook'.
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Before the Bank's CCC proposal arrived on their desks, the Treasury was searching for a statecraft strategy that could shield them from scrutiny for their role in the mismanagement of monetary policy. The system of direct controls was seized upon for its unfairness from the perspective of the 'man on the street', it was heavily lobbied against by industry for its insufficiency in freeing up adequate credit for struggling businesses, and it brought the government's economic credibility into question when monetary targets were missed. It is in this context -the failure of one form of depoliticised statecraft in the face of crisis -that we can understand the Treasury's acceptance of CCC.
Depoliticisation in place of solution
A new policy approach, CCC, landed in the Treasury's lap in January 1971. Yet it did not initially appear to resolve the policy dilemmas that they faced. Andrew
Britton, Senior Economic Advisor, succinctly captured this problem on 5 March:
The present forecasts show a company sector financial position which is quite possibly critical in the short run and which is certainly not sustainable in the medium term. The policy problem is to help companies without an excessive growth of money supply. 33 CCC, it seemed, was too simplistic an instrument to effect this kind of regressive redistribution. 34 Home Finance Advisor Frank Cassell was tasked with finding a compromise between the new approach and the existing export credit scheme in June, but was forced to conclude that the 'blunt fact is we think they do not tie in together at all well'. 35 These kinds of directional controls on lending clashed with CCC's philosophy of allowing banks to arrange their portfolios however they pleased.
Furthermore, as Figgures observed, CCC's emphasis on increases in Bank Rate
would be difficult to implement when 'the cost of borrowing money was already close to the return on investment'. 36 Nevertheless, the chief inadequacy of existing credit controls was judged to be the lending ceilings, not the price of credit. Indeed, domestic industry had become increasingly vocal in arguing this point. As early as 1969, the CBI had urged that 'more reliance should be placed on interest rates than restricting the availability of credit'. 37 In 1970 the CBI President advised that, with regards to lobbying strategy the availability of finance was a more serious problem than its cost. These considerations suggest to me than an attack on the credit ceiling, in which we were associated with the Clearing Banks, would be preferable to a request to them to revert to their earlier interest rate structure. This runs entirely counter to Moran's claim that the 'introduction of CCC was a sign that the cheap credit lobby [industry] in Whitehall had been eclipsed ' (1984: 51-52 This possibility was reinforced by the CBI's lobbying, whose demands chimed with those of the City (Moran 1984: 44) . All of this lends support to the claims of crisis resolution approaches to financialisation. Nevertheless, the Treasury's acquiescence cannot be understood in a purely functionalist manner. What persuaded the Treasury to endorse CCC was the fact that it would allow important exporting companies access to credit, at the same time as allowing the authorities to seemingly let go of the reigns of monetary policy.
This interpretation has certain ramifications for how IPE should theorise state/market relations. The state is not, and has arguably never been, a neglected field of study in IPE (Clift and Rosamond, 2009) . Nevertheless, the ways in which the state is conceptualised are often unsatisfactory. The financialisation literature's disinterest in statecraft reflects the more general neglect of state governance strategies in the dualistic state/market IPE analyses of Gilpin (1987) and Strange (1996) , as well as the pluralist state theory of scholars influenced by neo-Gramscian IPE (Van der Pijl 1989; Underhill 2000) . In contrast, the case of CCC demonstrates the centrality of statecraft strategies -depoliticisation in particular -for understanding the relationship between states and financial markets. As Bulpitt (1986: 28) argued, a key governing goal, especially in recessionary conditions, is to discover an 'automatic pilot, which, like the Gold Standard, would depoliticize' economic management. In fact, the evidence presented here suggests that financial deregulation in times of crisis should be understood as the outsourcing of discipline from the state to less overtly political mechanisms. The British authorities viewed the boundary between politics and markets less as a division between two externally-related and opposed modes of social organisation, and more as a line to be strategically blurred in order to ensure that governance was insulated from scrutiny. This contributes to the large body of literature challenging the notion of the mutual antagonism of states and markets, and in addition points to the calculated, strategic dimensions of this relationship.
Conclusion
This article began by examining interventions in the financialisation literature that deal with the causal relationship between productive stagnation and financial expansion, gathered here into two categories: expropriation and crisis resolution
approaches. Yet neither approach has placed significant emphasis on the role of statecraft. The state is generally conceptualised as a weathervane, with policy automatically changing direction in response to changing factional forces or economic imperatives. As such, the craft of governance is understood to have limited explanatory value. This mirrors a broader shortcoming in politics/economy dualist and neo-Gramscian-inspired IPE approaches to state/market relations. On the contrary, this article has endeavored to demonstrate the centrality of statecraft in mediating the processes of financialisation. In particular, it was argued that depoliticisation is a valuable analytical tool for understanding how governments attempt to insulate themselves from criticism by exercising economic policy covertly through financialised channels. This focus on statecraft can provide greater insights into the veracity of the competing expropriation and crisis resolution accounts of financialisation, and in turn cast state/market relations in a more strategic light.
The UK's CCC deregulation is a useful case for demonstrating the importance of statecraft. While the existing literature rightly points out that CCC was the Bank's brainchild, this radical deregulation nevertheless had to be accepted by the Treasurythe predominant economic department and a body with broader institutional duties to ensure economic and social stability. This article showed that intensifying economic stagnation was experienced by the Treasury as two distinct but interrelated obstacles to smooth economic governance: a personal borrowing boom and a company liquidity crisis. This posed a major threat to the government's key post-devaluation policy goal, namely to maintain a balance of payments surplus. The ceiling controls could not effectively repress personal borrowing in order to reduce consumption and imports without simultaneously starving companies of liquidity and thus reducing exports. Furthermore, the post-devaluation controls were too politicised to allow the government the leeway to carry out the necessary regressive redistribution of resources. In contrast, CCC would remove all formal limits on the availability of credit and instead allow high interest rates to adjudicate between borrowing requests.
This principle was lobbied for heavily by the CBI, which -with the Bank -convinced the Treasury that CCC had the potential to reduce consumer borrowing while allowing large exporting firms access to previously unavailable credit. Although direct evidence confirming the depoliticisation of policy is necessarily limited, due to officials' and politicians' unwillingness to admit to purposeful blame-shifting, there is sufficient archival evidence to suggest that the hands-off nature of CCC was welcomed because it would allow policy goals to be met in a depoliticised manner.
This would consequently shield the authorities from the blame for the accelerating economic crisis.
This case study has two important implications for IPE. Firstly, although the evidence is by no means sufficient to reject the broader claims of the expropriation approach, it does suggest that CCC in particular was not passed due to the colonisation of the Treasury by City acolytes nor because of the City's growing power to override the interests of domestic industry. Instead, CCC was a much deliberated over attempt to provide some kind of functional response to the deterioration of postwar affluence -lending support to the claims of crisis resolution approaches. Secondly, this case suggests that we follow Krippner (2011) in adding a layer of nuance to crisis resolution narratives, and to IPE debates on state/market relations, by considering statecraft as a powerful explanatory factor. The Treasury did not automatically react to the unfolding crisis by promoting financial deregulation.
Rather, by shifting emphasis from direct controls to (partly-marketised) interest rates, the Treasury hoped to outsource discipline to the price mechanism. This acts as further evidence as to the fruitfulness of the depoliticisation framework for understanding state behaviour in times of crisis, which in turn sheds light on the distinctly strategic nature of the relationship between states and markets.
